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REINVIGORATING INNOVATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS

[I

am] concern[ed] that…[DOD]
may not be pushing the stateof-the-art enough in terms of
technical performance. This endangers
our military technical superiority.
—Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)1

Military superiority depends, in part, on a
never-ending, dogged, and relentless pursuit
of technological advancement. In this
pursuit, the scientific method practically dictates that failures will outnumber successes.
Undoubtedly, you are familiar with
anecdotes of staggering investments in
under-performing, government-driven
research and development (R&D) initiatives. Today, a consistent media drumbeat
highlights the delays, cost overruns, and
performance concerns surrounding the joint
strike fighter and other major systems.2 On
closer examination, these failures often
derive from a dysfunctional approach to
the process of innovation rather than the
natural effects of trial and error. Indeed, the
defense acquisition community, saddled
with severe post-recession fiscal constraints
and a dysfunctional budget system, increasingly appears to adopt risk-averse practices
that stifle and undermine innovation. These
trends are cause for concern.

Over the past few decades,
the U.S. and our allies
have enjoyed a military
capability advantage over
any potential adversary….
It has been a good run, but
the game isn’t one sided,
and all military advantages
based on technology are
temporary.
—Frank Kendall,
Testimony Before the
House Committee on
Armed Services
(January 28, 2015)

The rise of foreign capability, coupled with
the overall decline in U.S. research and

The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes
that it must do more to spur innovation.3
Recently, Frank Kendall, under secretary of
defense (acquisition, technology, and logistics)
has honed his warning that DOD is underinvesting in maintaining its technological edge:
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development investments, is jeopardizing
our technological superiority.4

In light of DOD’s interest in deploying
procurement methods with the potential
to harness American ingenuity and ensure

battlefield superiority, we suggest that DOD’s
leadership make time for David McCullough’s
recent biography, The Wright Brothers,5 as an
aviation anecdote chockfull of fundamental
lessons DOD must embrace to succeed.
McCullough is one of the nation’s most
popular biographer historians for a reason.
His book is an entertaining re-introduction
to the Wright family and an informative
examination of one of the most iconic and
significant moments in paradigm-shifting
innovation. In that regard, it offers an ideal
window into the often-understated human
aspects of the R&D process.

Think Creatively
to Find Creators
The Wright Brothers takes us back to a
time when human flight, aeronautics, and
aviation were synonymous with witchcraft
and wizardry. Two young men imagined
that they could achieve what conventional
wisdom and folklore deemed impossible.
This great American epic is a tale of modest,
self-made bicycle mechanics, lacking college
education,6 but emboldened by a penchant
for bird-watching, who dared to imagine,
design, build, test, fly, master, and market
the world’s first lighter-than-air flying

REINVIGORATING INNOVATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS

Lessons Learned From
the Wright Brothers
☞ Experiment with prizes
and contests.
☞ Look outside the inner circle
for new ideas.
☞ Bigger isn’t always better.
☞ Prototyping makes sense:
fly before you buy.
☞ Embrace, understand, and
reward responsible risk-taking.
☞ Innovation respects no
geographical boundaries.

machine—all without government funding.
As DOD rethinks its approach to stimulate innovation, surely such an extraordinary story
contains valuable insights.

Embrace Prizes
and Contests
A repeated theme in The Wright Brothers
is the influence of European (and later,
American) prizes and contests intended
to spur innovation and foster competition.
These high-profile monetary and nonmonetary rewards served as a potent accelerant
to aviation innovation early in twentieth
century. Privately funded prize contests
such as the 1908 Michelin Prize (won by
Wilbur Wright) and the 1927 Ortieg Prize
(claimed by Charles Lindbergh in the Spirit of
St. Louis) set the stage for modern privately
funded contests such as the 2004 Ansari
XPrize (resulting in the public debut of thenmaverick SpaceX).
Lucrative prizes, of course, precede human
flight. As early as 1567, European sovereigns
offered prizes for a solution to the vexing problem of accurately determining a
ship’s longitude at sea, culminating in the
eponymous 1714 Longitude Prize.7 Unlike
government contracts and grants—i.e., the
conventional, heavily regulated, cumbersome, scandal-laden, and oft-criticized

Orville Wright, Age 34
Courtesy of: Library of Congress (LC-DIG-ppmsc-06102)

vehicles they tend to replace—prizes shift
R&D risk to the private sector and provide
governments access to previously untapped
innovative talent.
Unlike traditional, bilateral R&D contracts,
where the government chooses a single
(or very small number of) business partner(s)
in anticipation of performance, prizes engage
a theoretically infinite number of contestants
who are only rewarded if and when one or
more contestant satisfies the contest criteria.
Deploying an unlimited number of highly
motivated, independent research initiatives
increases the odds that the government will
benefit from novel approaches.

Contests shift the risk of failure (i.e., the
risk that effort will be expended without
compensation) to contestants. Rather than
agreeing to reimburse the private sector for
effort expended in advancing the state of
the art, the government only pays for success. This, in effect, harnesses the potential
of the trial-and-error approach to innovation that served the Wrights so well. The
government is not the only benefactor of
the prize contest arrangement—innovators
rush to invest their resources in contests
to claim hefty financial rewards and crave
the priceless imprimatur that accompanies
success. Winning a high-profile government
contest showers publicity of the type that
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a public relations firm might promise, but
likely cannot deliver.
Exploiting the renewed popularity and
seemingly limitless potential of prizes,
President Barack Obama formally encouraged federal agencies to adopt prize
contests, and shortly thereafter, Congress
authorized federal agencies to conduct prize
contests.8 Despite the compelling empirical, theoretical, and anecdotal evidence in
favor of prizes, they remain relatively novel
among federal agencies. This is particularly
disappointing in the aerospace arena, as an
increasingly consolidated industrial base
of airframe manufacturers dominate the
industry, which potentially stifles DOD’s ability to discover the dramatic ideas that could
animate the future of air supremacy.

Question
Conventionality;
Beware
Overreliance on
the Inner Circle
The success of privately sponsored prize contests in the aviation industry also bolsters
the idea that breakthrough solutions are
most likely to come from perspectives outside the relevant scientific discipline. In this
respect, the Wright brothers, who transitioned from printing newspapers and selling
bicycles to unlocking the mystery of flight,
are not alone. John Harrison, who solved
the centuries-old problem of calculating a
ship’s longitude at sea, was a self-taught
clockmaker, not a navigator. Napoleon’s
1795 Food Preservation Prize champion,
Nicolas Appert, was a confectioner before
he invented the modern practice of canning.
More recently, the “Mapping Dark Matter
Competition” was claimed by a glaciology
PhD student who crafted an algorithm—in
less than one week—that out-performed
state-of-the-art solutions proposed by leading physicists.9
In the last century, many notable advances
in aviation navigated and survived the
government’s highly regulated and burdensome R&D, production, deployment, and
foreign military sale processes. But could
it be that the 2012 success of SpaceX’s

Side view of glider flying as a kite near the ground, Wilbur at left and
Orville at right, glider turned forward to right and tipped downward
Courtesy of: Library of Congress (LC-DIG-ppmsc-06102)

Dragon—the first nongovernmental commercial spacecraft to deliver cargo to (and
return with cargo from) the International
Space Station10—was needed to remind us
that the Wright brothers were little-known,
lightly regarded “outsiders”? Given the dire
fiscal environment, increasing consolidation
in the U.S. aerospace industry,11 and government silos in innovation, DOD must embrace
outsiders and jettison the biases it exhibited
with regard to outside-of-the-box innovative
military solutions in the early 1900s. What
better time than today to question conventional wisdom?

Bigger Isn’t
Always Better
McCullough’s biography offers bountiful
ammunition supporting the theory that
off-the-radar small businesses and the
individuals behind them may offer the most
fruitful sources of innovation—as opposed

to the large, sophisticated, established, and
potentially bureaucratic corporations that
dominate the modern aerospace industry.
McCullough makes much of the U.S. government’s unwillingness to take seriously
the bicycle-building brothers from Dayton.
Even after the Wright brothers successfully
demonstrated flight, the U.S. War Department completely ignored them, preferring
instead to sink money into “The Great Aerodrome,” piloted by the high-profile Samuel
Langley and underwritten by the Smithsonian. On July 14, 1903, on the banks of
the Potomac River in Quantico—just days
before the Wright brothers made their historic flight at the then-remote and secluded
Kitty Hawk—Langley’s flawed behemoth
sank moments after it took off. Given the
government funding and resources that
sank with it, the contrast between the
brothers’ success and the government’s
failure could not be more stark:
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[N]either [Orville nor Wilbur] ever said the
stunning contrast between their success
and Samuel Langley’s full-scale failure just
days before made what they had done on
their own all the more remarkable…. [T]he
Langley project had cost nearly $70,000, the

you fly it.” Unfortunately, this basic commercial purchasing principle was lost somewhere during the 20th century transition
from the War Department to the leviathan,
process-oriented, congressionally micromanaged, and budget-challenged DOD.

and programmatic cost might be before the
government chose its long-term business
partner. Experience confirms that fielding a
weapon system—and actually using it—is a
very different experience from reading (or
dreaming) about it.

Prototyping is neither novel nor revolutionary; indeed, longstanding defense and federal acquisition policy favors such a systematic
approach.15 Delaying production commitments until after concept demonstration
and validation increases the government’s
up-front R&D investment in the pursuit of
confirming operability and ensuring longterm return on investment. Unfortunately,
DOD has eschewed flying prototypes—let
alone competitive prototypes—for the KC-X
(the in-flight refueling tanker, even though
the procurement was billed as a commercial
acquisition) and, more recently, the nextgeneration long range strike bomber.16

A valuable spillover of prototyping is the
potential for a more robust and accurate
projection of a program’s life cycle cost,17
rather than exclusive—and naïve—reliance
on purchase price. Life cycle cost takes into
account the total cost to purchase, field,
deploy, arm, maintain, improve, sustain,
and ultimately retire a weapon system. In
other words, life cycle cost reflects what the
government actually pays for the performance it receives.

greater part of it public money, whereas the
brothers’ total expenses for everything from
1900 to 1903, including materials and travel
to and from Kitty Hawk, came to a little less
than $1,000, a sum paid entirely from the
modest profits of their bicycle business.12

Governments tend toward this kind of behavior. In his compelling history of the Predator
drone, Richard Whittle chronicled the quest
of Abraham (Abe) Karem, a Baghdad-born Israeli engineer whose inability to thrive within
the bureaucracies of the Israeli Air Force and
Israel aerospace industries led to his emigration to the United States.13 Like the Wright
brothers, whose creative genius flourished
in the family bicycle store and on windswept
beaches, Karem’s vision for remotely-controlled flight was conceived outside of the
established domestic industrial base.
With so much time and attention focused
on the joint strike fighter, next-generation
long range strike bomber, and other increasingly dominant, all-encompassing weapons
systems,14 we fear DOD reverting to the
instincts that drew it to the attractive but
ultimately ineffective Great Aerodrome. One
wonders what revolutionary innovations by
modern-day Wright brothers the Pentagon
may have ignored. Can the United States
avoid missing out on—and instead spur—innovation in its own back yard? While we
believe that prize contests may attract
new ideas, we also believe that jettisoning
fixed-price R&D contracts—which prioritize
arbitrary budgets over proven performance—
and investing in competitive prototypes
would pay exponential dividends.

The Power of
Prototyping: Fly
Before You Buy
A century ago, the government customers
featured in The Wright Brothers understood
a fundamental, simple, and commonsense
acquisition proposition: “Don’t buy it until
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DOD—and Congress, the media, and the public—is increasingly critical of dramatic cost
overruns, an entirely predictable outcome
when the government commits to unproven
technological solutions for which estimating production costs is obviously premature.
If the government wants to know—rather
than guess—what a major defense program
will cost, and, more important, what value
that program will provide, it must collect
data through operational testing before the
R&D process transitions to full production.
Customers lack the critical information necessary to grasp how expensive, reliable, and
capable an airframe is until they fly it—and
maybe even crash it. Instead of awarding
large-scale, generation-spanning production contracts based upon promises made
before the development and testing cycle is
complete, the government should consider
and vigorously test alternative approaches
until a proven platform emerges.
A prudent long-term investment approach
would pay multiple competitors to develop,
field, and test a prototype. End-users and
stakeholders—including pilots, missile
and munitions teams, mechanics, wing
commanders, strategists, and, yes, accountants—could form a better idea of what the
actual functionality, customer satisfaction,

DOD understands that the cost of building
and flying prototypes is fully justified in
order to save money (not to mention save
lives and ensure battlefield superiority) over
the several decades that airframes stay
in service. Sadly, DOD currently lacks the
stomach to confront—and Congress lacks
the sophistication to grasp—the necessity of making short-term investments to
achieve long-terms savings. In the modern
era of short-sighted, budget-driven decisionmaking,18 DOD could be forgiven were the
stakes not so high.

Risk: Not Just
Cost Overruns
and Delays
Innovation entails risk, and the Wright
brothers remind us that risk involves
matters more significant than cost overruns, schedule slippage, or degradation of
aspirational performance specifications.
Every time the brothers tested their flying
machine, they risked their lives.
Early on, the brothers decided never to fly
together. If one brother died, the other
could continue their quest. The brothers
understood the necessity of risk-taking, and
their willingness to assume the ultimate
risk set them apart from leading figures in
aviation theory—most of whom never attempted flight.

REINVIGORATING INNOVATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS

Flying machines crash, and (test) pilots and
their passengers do not always survive.19
Orville nearly died in the Fort Myer crash
that claimed the life of Army Lieutenant
Thomas Selfridge.20
In recounting Wilbur Wright’s first public
speech on flight, later dubbed “The Book
of Genesis of the twentieth-century Bible
of Aeronautics,” McCullough described the
Wright Brothers’ risk calculus:

The Wright brothers willingly assumed great
risk in the name of technological progress, but they took that risk on their own
terms. The brothers never rushed laborious
pre-flight inspections, and wind conditions
frequently prompted cancellations. Despite
enormous pressure, Orville and Wilbur
understood that—to properly mitigate
risk—they must sometimes disappoint
thousands of spectators, including hundreds
of congressman, senators, military officers,
and potential customers.23

What was needed…for success with a flying machine…was the ability to ride with
the wind, to balance and steer in the air.
[Rather than]…explain how a bird could
soar through the air[,]…he took a sheet of
paper, and…let it drop. It would not “settle
steadily down as a staid, sensible piece of
paper ought to do, but it insists on contravening every recognized rule of decorum,
turning over and darting hither and thither
in the most erratic manner, much after
the style of an untrained horse.” This was
the kind of horse, he said, that men had to
learn to manage in order to fly, and there
were two ways: “One is to get on him and

Innovation
Respects No
Geographical
Boundaries
America’s hubris with regard to its technical superiority and its historical status as
a unique incubator for creative, innovative,
and entrepreneurial endeavor must be
critically reexamined. Innovation, and, more
broadly, intellectual capital, respects no
geographical boundaries. Any technological advantage the United States may have
historically enjoyed is rapidly eroding:

learn by actual practice how each motion
and trick may be best met; the other is to

[U.S.] government policies no longer shape

sit on a fence and watch the beast a while,

industry environment as much as they did

and then retire to the house and at leisure

in the past…. As long as the nation’s pre-

figure out the best way of overcoming his

dominance in the global advanced technol-

jumps and kicks. The latter system is the

ogy sector is under relative erosion, the U.S.

safest, but the former, on the whole, turns

will no longer be able [to] dominate entire

out the larger proportion of good riders.”21

global value chains…. When U.S.-based
companies do dominate critical value ac-

The Wright brothers’ courage and example
resonates today. Frank Kendall bemoaned that,
in a challenging environment dominated by
tight budgets and an emphasis on compliance:
[DOD] may not be pushing the stateof-the-art enough in terms of technical
performance…. Simply delivering what was

tivities, the latter tend to rely on strategic

lead to failure in achieving our evolving naacquisition exists in the first place….22

The potential cost of systemic risk aversion—
conservative unwillingness to take risks and
fail—does not bode well for DOD’s ability to
sustain technological battlespace superiority.

—“Better Buying Power
Fact Sheet” (April 9, 2015)

United States rebuffed the Wright Brothers
and turned a blind eye until their machine—
and the skills necessary to harness it—were
publicly demonstrated, celebrated, taught,
and sold—in Europe.
After their success at Kitty Hawk, the brothers’ sense of patriotic duty outweighed any
sting of rejection, such that they gave their
country one last chance before taking their
wares to Europe.25 Their persistence proved
fruitless. Despite their description of their
successful 1904 trial flights, and the fact
that the Wrights made no appeal for financial support, the War Department answered
with a boilerplate rejection letter.26

alliances with foreign corporations.24

In other words, innovation cannot be
perceived as a domestic sport over which
Americans enjoy a natural monopoly. Globalization—and competition from abroad—cannot be ignored.

initially required on cost and schedule can
tional security mission—the reason defense

“Innovation…
increasingly…
comes from the
commercial
sector and
from overseas.”

Even though it played out in a far more insular and dramatically less globalized community, one of the most remarkable aspects of
the Wright Brothers’ story was their success
despite the U.S. government’s utter and complete disregard for their endeavors. Instead of
investigating and incubating this transformative technology that would forever change
the nature of warfare and civilian travel, the

When Wilber Wright arrived in Europe
shortly thereafter, he was warmly welcomed and celebrated. (Fortunately, for
the Wrights and the aviation industry, this
was a time before export controls may
have made such an excursion impossible.27)
Wilbur flew hundreds of public demonstrations in several countries, enthusiastically
attended by military and public officials,
celebrities, royalty, and throngs of people
that traversed Europe chasing rumors that
Wilbur Wright would make their wildest
dreams come true. The French benefitted
the most from this cultural exchange. The
French pilots Wilbur Wright trained almost
immediately began challenging the Wrights
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administrator for Procurement Law and Legislation at the Office of Federal Procurement

I esteem it a great honor and an opportunity to present
these medals to you as an evidence of what you have done.
I am so glad—perhaps at a delayed hour—to show that in
America it is not true that “a prophet is not without honor
save in his own country”…. You made this discovery by
a course that we of America like to feel is distinctly
American—by keeping your noses right at the job until
you had accomplished what you had determined to do.
—President Taft presenting the Wright Brothers
Gold Medals on behalf of the Aero Club of America
(June 10, 1909)

Policy. He received NCMA’s Charles A. Dana
Distinguished Service Award in 2012. Prof.
Schooner gratefully acknowledges Seymour
Herman for his continued support of government procurement law research at the George
Washington University Law School.
NATHANIEL E. CASTELLANO is a graduate of
the George Washington University Law School,
where he was recognized as the Murray
Schooner Scholar for excellence in the study
of government procurement law. At the time
of publication, he was an associate in the
Government Contracts and National Security
practice of Arnold & Porter LLP. He will begin
a term as a law clerk for the Honorable Jimmie
V. Reyna on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit beginning in mid-April 2016.

as record-setting aviators using the Wright
machines and—leading up to World War I—
the French aviation industry blossomed.

Conclusion:
Incentives,
Imagination,
and Innovation

By the time the Wright brothers signed their
first contract with the U.S. War Department,
worth $25,000,28 the brothers had received
$35,000 from French Syndicate payments,
prize money, and cash awards, not including
the contract signed with the French government. In total, their exploits in Europe resulted in over $300,000 in contracts and prizes.

The McCullough biography points to any
number of Wright family traits that led to
their success. The brothers were exhaustive
researchers and the kind of tireless workers
frequently branded—and sometimes derided—as “grinders.” But the Wright brothers were also visionaries on the grandest
scale, reshaping the art of the possible by
painstaking trial and error and meticulous
observation, record keeping, and attention
to detail. The brothers excelled at efficiently
and effectively identifying, isolating, and
then pragmatically solving problems. Their
success depended upon quiet self-confidence and their unwavering resolve.

No U.S. government funding, policy, or
initiative contributed to the Wright brothers
embarking upon their ambitious quest. Nor
did government efforts to nurture a nascent
industry propel them past any significant
hurdle. Ultimately, the U.S. government
consistently failed to invest in, let alone
sustain, accelerate, or foster their efforts.
Conversely, European enthusiasm—backed
by generous private and public funding—empowered the rapid evolution of the
burgeoning aviation industry.
In an increasingly globalized technological
environment, DOD must reimagine its relationship with its allies in the pursuit of technological superiority. Among other things,
DOD needs to build bridges with its allies to
foster and incentivize collaborative R&D.

Readers may draw innumerable lessons
from these examples. Although the quest
for models and case studies—much like the
pursuit of innovation—is endless, commencing the journey is the first critical step. CM

STEVEN L. SCHOONER, CPCM, NCMA
FELLOW, is the Nash & Cibinic Professor of
Government Procurement Law at The George
joining the faculty, he was the associate
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